It should be clear by now that any claim
that consciousness (or “mind” as the word is being used here) is amenable to
scientific investigation would either be a claim based on a variant use of the
word “consciousness” or else an error of judgement (possibly originating in our
propensity to consider the objective world as the primary reality, the
starting point for such an investigation, misleading us into putting the
cart before the horse). Given that consciousness does not admit of analysis by
those methods employed to investigate empirical phenomena, it would seem that
all attempts to find a solution to the mind/body problem will entail metaphysical
hypotheses rather than scientific hypotheses - i.e. hypotheses that
cannot be eliminated on empirical grounds but only on grounds of logical
inconsistency.
The pages down the right hand side comprise an essay in defence of panexperientialism and should be read in order.
The Mind/Body Problem
There is a clear association between the
conceived self-as-person and the idea of the field of experience, and
this association has been the subject of much discussion in the Western world
ever since Descartes brought it to the fore in the seventeenth century. This is
the infamous “mind/body problem”, where the word “mind” is being used to refer
to the instantiation of consciousness (field of experience) assumed to be
associated with a particular “body” (i.e. a living person, in just the same way
as the word was used when referencing the “problem of other minds”). The
“problem” is that of providing an explanatory account of how mind and body
relate to each other.
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