A particularly interesting consequence of
panexperientialism would pertain to pairs of objects that are related in such a
manner as to have certain correlated attributes but that have both
dissolved into the wholeness (i.e. temporarily ceased to appear as objects
within any instantiation of consciousness). When either one of those objects
precipitates in some instantiation of consciousness or other (i.e. when, from a
human perspective, a “measurement” has been made upon it), reducing its
observed attributes from the range of possible attributes to a collection of
actual attributes, the correlated attributes for the other (as yet
unexperienced or unmeasured) object would immediately be reduced in
accordance with those of the measured object. (This would be consistent with
the nonlocal aspects of the quantum theory. See appendix 1.)
The pages down the right hand side comprise an essay in defence of panexperientialism and should be read in order.
Space
Within our conceptual model of the
objective world, the spatial relationships between objects engender the idea of
"space" as a reified theatre within which objects have their
existence, and (consistent with materialism) within which such objects exist
whether or not they are experienced. But the objective world itself consists of
a category of the constituents of consciousness, and in panexperientialism
there is nothing other than instantiations of consciousness. The conception of "space"
consistent with materialism, then, has no role to play in panexperientialism,
even though spatial relations still obtain between objects appearing within any
particular instantiation of consciousness.
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