Realism with respect to a class of objects
is the view that the objects in the class are real in contrast to their
being useful or convenient fictions. Science tells us that perceptual
objects like trees and rocks are comprised of more fundamental conceptual
objects like protons, neutrons, electrons, etc. and scientific realism
is the view that such conceptual objects should, in the reductionist spirit, be
considered as real as the perceptual objects they comprise. One may also be a
realist with regard to "the past", "the future",
"other minds", etc. However, postulating the existence and nature of some
non-experiential "reality" that supposedly underpins the world of
experience is not science but metaphysics, and has often led to erroneous
conceptual models. Consequently I will stipulate my use of the word “real” in
such a manner as to implicate anything that makes a practical difference in our
lives - i.e. we might confer “reality” upon those objects (both perceptual and
conceptual) that impact upon us in a predictable and repeatable manner, even if
this means that we confer reality only on a provisional basis. I will refer to
this as pragmatic realism to distinguish it from what I will call materialistic
realism - the metaphysical doctrine that the “real” world is independent
of any consciousness of it. Pragmatic realism makes no such metaphysical
demand.
In pragmatic realism the moon is
considered real because it affects our daily lives, whether or not it would
continue to exist in the absence of any consciousness of it. On grounds of
their explanatory power, protons, neutrons, and electrons are also considered
real (note the technological advances that have been enabled by advances in
particle physics), but there is a fly in the ointment here. We are inclined to
consider “real” objects to have precise attributes at all times, just as we
conceive trees and rocks to have. Adapted to our environment as we are, we
believe objects to continue to exist even when nobody is looking at them. In
the case of predators that have disappeared from view, our lives may depend
upon that belief. So given the notion that there could be some particular
duration in which absolutely nobody was looking at the moon, we still believe
that the moon continues to exist with some precise size, mass, and location in
space for that duration. This belief is supported by related effects that
continue to be observed, like the moon's tidal influences upon the world’s
oceans. A consequence of this is our innate conviction that all objects
continue to have precise attributes whilst between observations, and that any
inaccuracy in our knowledge of the attributes of such an object is a consequence
of our inability to make sufficiently precise measurements upon it. But
developments in physics have seriously challenged this conviction in respect of
the continued existence of quantum systems whilst between observations (see
appendix 1). This brings out the metaphysical aspect underlying that conviction
and challenges this metaphysical position in the particular case of quantum
systems, but it does not challenge the pragmatic belief in the continued
existence of classical (i.e. non-quantum) objects. The consequences of classical
objects going absent between direct observations would be far more grievous
than that of, say, an electron going absent between interactions, provided that
electron interactions remain lawful.
So, if by reason of innate prejudice we
confer "reality" only upon objects that are conceived to exist even
in the absence of any consciousness of them (materialistic realism), then
panexperientialism clearly does not qualify as a form of realism. But if by
reason of linguistic convention we confer "reality" upon those
objects (perceptual and conceptual) that impact upon us in a predictable and
repeatable manner, then subscribing to panexperientialism presents no obstacle
to considering objects such as the moon, trees, and rocks to be real.
However, quantum objects (such as electrons and photons) whilst between
interactions might still fail to qualify as real, but this would be of no
consequence to our practical lives and so would not undermine pragmatic
realism.
Hilary Putnam
has argued that, since the conceptual objects of science have tremendous
explanatory power, it would be a miracle if these objects were not
real. We should take care here to maintain our distinction between pragmatic
realism and materialistic realism. I take the word "miracle" to
indicate a violation of the consistent orderliness that obtains between constituents
of the objective world - i.e. miracles are
violations of the “laws of nature”. Any relationship that might obtain between
the entire field of experience and whatever might putatively be “beyond” it
(and responsible for the orderliness that manifests within it) is not a “law of
nature”. The orderliness that obtains within the field of experience (i.e. between
the constituents of consciousness) is a necessary precondition for the
possibility of useful explanation, and the human propensity to seek explanation
transgresses its limits when it seeks an account of why such explanation is
possible at all. The upshot is that panexperientialism is realist in
respect of other minds and is consistent with pragmatic realism in that
everyday objects like trees and rocks may be considered real. It may also be
considered consistent with scientific realism given that conceptual objects
such as galaxies and atoms may be considered provisionally real (i.e.
real unless and until new evidence comes to light that would call that
ascription into question). Consequently we should be suspicious of any impulse
to reject panexperientialism on grounds of our innate materialism.
There is, however, a credible argument
that undermines the view presented in this account, and this is the most
convenient place to consider that argument[1].
Special Relativity Theory predicts that a system of photons has zero
mass when the photons are all travelling in the same direction, but that the
system has non-zero mass when the photons are not all travelling in the same
direction (see Appendix 2). If this
is indeed the case then, just as tidal influences on the world's oceans provide
evidence that the moon continues to exist when nobody is looking at it, so the
acquisition of mass in systems of photons would provide evidence that photons
continue to exist between their interactions.
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